Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Federal Financial Company, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. Mi Ranchita d.b.a. Gudalahara Grill and Manuel
T. Armenta as guarantor, Defendant and Appellant :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan W. Cannon; John R. Riley; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Mntivel A. Burke, II; Law Offices of Montivel A. Burke, II; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Federal Financial Company v. Mi Ranchita, No. 990151 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2049

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BR,EF
JTAH
DOCUMENT
CFU
A10
DOCKET NO.

.?^/yg-

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee,

MI RANCHITA d.b.a. GUADALAHARA
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as
guarantor,

Appellate Case No. 990151-CA
Argument Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from final Order entered on January 22, 1999, denying Motion by
Defendant/Appellant, Manuel T. Armenta, for an Order Vacating and Setting Aside the
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on April 14, 1998, and the Amended Order
Granting Summary Judgment filed on May 7, 1998 (hereinafter "Motion to Vacate").
Also, this appeal is from a final [Amended] Order entered on February 1, 1999, denying
the Motion to Vacate. The Orders were of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Steven L. Henriod, Judge Presiding.
Bryan W. Cannon (SBN 0561)
John R. Riley (SBN 2758)
Aspen Plaza
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, U T 84094

Montivel A. Burke, II (SBN 6505)
Law Offices of Montivel A. Burke, II
360 West 550 South
Orem, UT 84058
(801) 224-4588

(801) 255-7475
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee

Attorneys for Defendant and A»g|llan£r^
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 2 6 1999
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

INTHEC0T1RI of A P P L A L N O I - 1111 S n i M H

r;

> REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLA

rnrR \i FINANCIAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff and App

uUn

]

t

v.

,

i Appellate Case No. 990151 -CA
MI RANCHITA d.b.a. GUADALAHARA
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as
guarantor,
) Argument Priority No. 15
Defendant and Appellant.

]

Appeal from final Order entered on January 22, 1999, denying Motion "by
Defendant/Appellant, Manuel T. Armenia, for an. Order Vacating and Setting Aside' the
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on April 14, 1998, and the Amended Oi dei
Granting Summary Judgment filed on May 7, 1993 (hereinafter "Motion to ¥30316').
Also, this appeal is from a final [Amended] Order entered on February 1, 1999, denying
the Motion to Vacate. The Orders were of the Third District Court for Salt Lake Com
State of Utah, the Honorable Steven I I lenriod, Judge Presiding.
Bryan W, Cannon i
JohnR. Riley (SBN
Aspen Plaza
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, UT 84094
(801) 255-7475

-1)

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee

Montivel A. L>W
LawOffic360 West
Orem, VI S4L^O
(801; 224 4588
A

$&.* o^u.
- * «'»*'

-

ttorneys for Defendaih ji.j Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ADDITIONAL DETERMINATIVE CASES

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

2

ARGUMENTS

3

I.

II.

THE KEY TO DEFENDANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF
UNDER RULE 60 (b)(6) IS THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT
NEVER HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WITHIN THE THREE MONTHS' PERIOD
AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED

3

THE EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT WAS
DILIGENT

5

A.

B.

C.
III.
IV.
V.

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE PERIOD
AFTER HIS PRIOR COUNSEL WITHDREW AND
BEFORE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED

6

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE THREE
MONTHS' PERIOD AFTER JUDGMENT WAS
ENTERED

11

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT ONCE HE RECEIVED
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT

12

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAW

14

EQUITY REQUIRES GRANTING DEFENDANT RELIEF
ON THIS APPEAL

17

THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CANNOT

i

DEFEAT DEFENDANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF
BASED ON LACK OF DUE PROCESS

19

CONCLUSION

21

DATED AND SIGNED BY ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

21

ADDENDUM
CASES
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429,
430
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern
Properties (1992) 838 P.2d 672, 673

ii

a
b

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P. 2d 21, 22, 11
Utah 2d 357

5

Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429, 430. .
Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development (1980) 611 P. 2d 369,
371
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties
(1992) 838 P. 2d 672, 673

3,4,10

20
3,4

RULES
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2,14,16

Rule 4-504 (4) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration

4

Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

4

Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

20

Rule 60 (b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

iii

2,5,16
2,4,16,19,20

ADDITIONAL DETERMINATIVE CASES
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429, 430
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties (1992)
838 P. 2d 672, 673
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 28, 1998, Defendant was personally served with a Supplemental
Proceedings Order in this action at Defendant's home address (hereinafter "Defendant's
Home Address") at 1116 West 285 South in Orem, Utah. [R. 110] There is no evidence
or other reference in the record in this appeal showing that Defendant was ever served at
Defendant's Home Address of any notice of the judgment, amended judgment, or motion
for summary judgment upon which such judgments were based herein. Within two (2)
weeks after receiving such actual notice of the judgment, Defendant appeared at court on
the Supplemental Proceedings and within one week later hired current counsel. Current
counsel promptly contacted Plaintiff's counsel and made Plaintiff's counsel aware from the
outset that Defendant's current counsel would be moving the trial court to set aside the
judgments. In light of such circumstances, Defendant appeals to this court for relief in
order that Defendant may simply afforded substantial due process consisting of a fair
opportunity to defend this action on the merits.
/ / /

III
1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The most important fact rendering Defendant entitled to the relief requested in this
appeal is that Defendant did not have "ACTUAL" notice of the judgment entered against
him until August 28, 1998 when a Supplemental Proceedings Order was personally served
on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address. By such time, the three (3) months1 period
of time permitting relief under Rule 60 (b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, had since
expired. Nonetheless, Defendant actively made diligent efforts to find out facts about how
such a judgment could have been entered against him, hired current counsel, and instructed
Defendant's current counsel to move the trial court to set aside the judgment. Defendant
was substantially deprived of due process in this matter and is therefore entitled to relief
under Rule 60 (b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Also, Plaintiff's counsel did not comply with the Spirit of Rule 5, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, in providing the best means available to afford actual notice of the
judgment to Defendant, since Plaintiff's counsel knew at all times that Defendant could be
served with such actual notice at Defendant's Home Address. As such, Defendant was
deprived of due process and the balance of fairness for this reason and for others set forth
in the Arguments Section hereinbelow should tip in favor of granting relief to Defendant.
In addition, Defendant is entitled to relief herein on the grounds of deprivation of
due process, regardless of whether or not this court agrees with Defendant's separate and
independent grounds for relief of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's primary
2

entitlement to such relief is based on lack of due process and on that ground alone should
be granted the relief requested herein.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE KEY TO DEFENDANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF UNDER
RULE 60 (b)(6) IS THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT NEVER HAD
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN THE
THREE MONTHS' PERIOD AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
Two (2) specific cases illustrate that the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of

Appeals favor ruling for Defendant in the instant case based on the fact that Defendant
never received "ACTUAL" notice of the default judgment entered within the three (3)
months period following entry thereof. For example, in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court
in Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429, 430, and then the Utah
Court of Appeals in 1992, in Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern
Properties (1992) 838 P.2d 672, 673, both courts found that the defendants in such cases
had obtained "actual" notice of the respective default judgments when such defendants
were personally served with a Supplemental Proceedings Order within the three (3)
months' period following entry of such judgments. Both courts thus ruled against the
defendants in such cases for having not taken action to set aside the judgment within such
three months' period.
///
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Also, in Lincoln, the defendant had argued that plaintiff s counsel had failed to give
proper notice under Rule 58A(d) and Rule 4-504(4). However, the court ruled that failure
to give such notice under such rules did not invalidate the judgment. Rather, the court
focused on whether actual notice had been received by defendant within the three
months' window after entry of the judgment and how quickly defendant acted upon
receiving such notice.
In the case at bar, Defendant received "actual" notice of the judgment in the same
manner as did the defendants in Gardiner, supra at 430, and Lincoln, supra at 675,
namely, by personal service of a Supplemental Proceedings Order. However, in stark
contrast to the defendants in those cases. Defendant in the case at bar did not receive
such actual notice until after expiration of the three months' period following entry
of the judgment.

Even counsel for Plaintiff in the case at bar confirms that "The

Supplemental Order is also a Notice of the Entry of Judgment." [See Appellee's Brief,
Page 19, Lines 3-4]
Although there is no reported Utah case where the defendant did not receive actual
notice of the default judgment until after the three months period had expired, it is obvious
from Gardiner and Lincoln that the proper ruling to be made here is that as long as
Defendant acted diligently once he received actual notice, even if such actual notice
occured after the three months period had expired, then Defendant is entitled to relief
under Rule 60 (b)(6). The reason being is that lack of due process is a reason long
4

established for justifying relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) as confirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P.2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d 357.
The arguments by Plaintiff's counsel that Defendant received "notice" of the motion for
summary judgment and of the judgment are only arguments. In fact, Plaintiff's counsel
even notes that he obtained issuance of a Supplemental Proceedings Order less than one
month after judgment had been entered. However, Plaintiff's counsel fails to inform the
Court about "the rest of the story" which is that the record reflects that such first
Supplemental Proceedings Order was not served on Defendant until August 13, 1998, by
substituted service [R. 107], after the three months' window of Rule 60 (b)(1), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, had expired. The record demonstrates that none of the notices mailed
by Plaintiff's counsel were ever sent to Defendant at Defendant's Home Address where
Plaintiff's counsel demonstrated more than once he knew to be a sure place to serve actual
notice on Defendant. As such, Defendant is entitled to relief herein.
II.

THE

EVIDENCE

ILLUSTRATES

THAT

DEFENDANT

WAS

DILIGENT.
It is necessary in this Section of Defendant's Reply to dispel the many conclusory
statements made by Plaintiffs counsel against Defendant in Appellee's Brief which
concern the issue of Defendant' s diligence. Plaintiff s counsel not only attempts to mislead
this Court regarding such issue but actually has lied to this Court about certain "facts" in
efforts to cloud the truth as shown below. Such conduct by Plaintiffs counsel further
5

demonstrates the need for this Court to exercise its authority and grant relief to Defendant
so that he can have a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits of this case. This
Section is broken down into three (3) main time periods: (a) After Defendant's prior
counsel withdrew and before entry of judgment; (b) during the three months' period after
judgment was entered; and (c) once Defendant obtained actual notice of the judgment.
A.

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE PERIOD
AFTER HIS PRIOR COUNSEL WITHDREW AND
BEFORE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
Plaintiff's counsel has blatantly lied in efforts to mislead this Court into

believing that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions for a
period of seventeen (17) months. In fact, Plaintiff's counsel stated as follows:
The discovery was served on Armenta in July, 1997, prior to
withdrawal of his first attorney. Despite knowing of the
discovery since July, 1997, Armenta and his new counsel took
no action to answer the discovery for a seventeen (17) month
period despite an order of the trial court compelling Armenta
to answer. [See Appellee's Brief, Page 14, Lines 3-6]
On the contrary, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff's first, not second, set of Request
for Admissions was served on Defendant on July 22, 1997. [R. 137-142 (Exhibit "2")]
The record also proves that Defendant responded to such first set of Request for
6

Admissions as confirmed by the Court's prior discovery motion order dated November 3,
1997. [R. 157-158 (Exhibit" "6")] The court's order granted an award of fees but made
no order requiring discovery responses from Defendant because the court found that
Defendant had already produced such responses. [R. 157-158 (Exhibit ""6")] Also, it is
clear that Plaintiff's second, not first, set of Request for Admissions was served on
December 2, 1997 [R. 159-164 (Exhibit "7")], which was one (1) month after the trial
court confirmed that Defendant had responded to the first Request for Admissions. In
addition, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment which ultimately was granted was not
filed until January 29, 1998. [R. 85-86] In fact, once Defendant obtained actual notice
of such Motion, Defendant not only filed the subject Motion to Vacate the judgment herein
but also Defendant served full and complete written responses to Plaintiff's second set of
discovery requests. [R. 180-220 (Exhibit "15"), R. 257-258] Therefore, the contentions
by Plaintiff1 s counsel are totally deceptive in light of the clear record before this
Court.

As such, Defendant cannot be found to have been lacking in diligence in

responding to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Defendant is thus entitled to prevail in this
appeal.
In addition, Plaintiff's counsel focuses on the trial court's improper finding
that "the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact with his attorney who
was representing him through the Motion for Summary Judgment in this case". Such
finding flies in the face of facts and evidence before the trial court and this Court which
7

indicate otherwise. How could Defendant be responsible for not remaining in contact with
his attorney when his attorney, Mr. Russell, withdrew as counsel BEFORE the Motion
for Summary Judgment was even filed?

Defendant had no attorney with which to

communicate during such period of time and prior to such time any communication with
counsel would not have helped Defendant to gain knowledge of the not-yet-filed-or-served
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The record demonstrates clearly that Mr. Russell

withdrew as counsel on January 15, 1998 [R. 166-167] and that Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed on January 29, 1998. [R. 85-86] Thus, Mr. Russell was
not representing Defendant through the time when the Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed rendering the trial court's finding unsupported and irrelevant. The real issue was
whether or not Defendant had actual notice of such Motion. Since Defendant did not have
actual notice of such Motion, Defendant has been deprived of due process and has not had
a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits.
Also, the assertion by Plaintiff's counsel that". . .his [Defendant's] attorneys
withdrew because Defendant failed to cooperate with his counsel in answering discovery"
is unfounded in terms of Plaintiff's counsel's attempt to prove some type of pattern of
Defendant's conduct in not communicating properly with his attorneys. While Ms. Chacon
did indicate in her Motion to Withdraw that she was unable to reach Defendant during a
four (4) week period eariler in the case, there is no evidence in the record or otherwise
which indicates any reason why Mr. Russell withdrew as counsel for Defendant. Again,
8

Plaintiff's counsel is free with asserting conclusory statements without being so kind as to
provide the Court or Defendant's counsel with any clue as to where evidentiary support
for such statements exists. The answer is that there is no evidentiary support for such
assertions by Plaintiff's counsel. As such, this Court must disregard such unsupported
contentions and not be misled by the continuous efforts by Plaintiff's counsel to shift the
focus of this Court away from the real issues and real evidence to be reviewed in this
appeal.
Plaintiff's counsel also claims, again without support and in total
contradiction to the actual evidence before the court, that Defendant ". . .condoned the
filing of affidavits by his son bearing forged signatures purporting to be his." [see
Appellee's Brief, Page 13, Lines 14-15] Such mudslinging by Plaintiff's counsel is
needless and in fact done in bad faith. The only evidence before the court on this issue
was as set forth in the Declarations of Defendant and one of his sons, Sergio Armenta.
In both Declarations, great detail is provided which explain that Defendant's prior
attorney, Mr. Russell, acted so grossly incompetent that he attempted to have Sergio
Armenta sign an affidavit on behalf of Defendant in opposition to a prior Motion to
Compel by Plaintiff. [R. 234-245 % 6] Sergio explained that he had been misled by Mr.
Russell into signing such affidavit and that he never would have signed it otherwise
because he knew he was not authorized to sign any such statement on behalf of his father,
Defendant in this action. [R. 234-245 1 6] Also, Defendant's Declaration confirms that
9

he had not authorized Sergio to sign any such affidavit for Defendant. [R. 234-245 % 6
and R. 226-233 t1 9, 10] If any misconduct occurred regarding such affidavit, it was
solely by attorney Mr. Russell, not Defendant or Defendant's son, Sergio. Thus, the
statement by Plaintiff's counsel that Defendant has condoned improper conduct is totally
false and is irrelevant since it deals with an affidavit in a prior discovery motion which has
nothing to do with the real issue at hand of Defendant's diligence. As such, Plaintiff's
counsel is showing his true colors in how he is making further efforts to prevent Defendant
from receiving the benefits of due process and to deny Defendant of his constitutional and
statutory rights to have a trial on the merits of this case.
In addition, Plaintiffs counsel attempts to analogize the facts of the case of
Gardiner, supra, with those of the case at bar in terms of the court in Gardiner finding that
the defendant lacked diligence. However, Plaintiffs counsel has totally misrepresented
the facts of such case because the court in Gardiner ruled against defendant for having
failed to communicate with the defendant's attorney for an alarming period of one and onehalf (1 1/2) years.
In contrast, Defendant in this case was actively pursuing the defense of this
case including hiring a second attorney later in the case, Mr. Russell, to defend against
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in September 1997. Communication with Mr. Russell was
not the problem. Rather, the problem came shortly thereafter, when Mr. Russell withdrew
as counsel, leaving Defendant without counsel. Defendant did not receive actual notice
10

of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed a mere nine (9) days alter Mr. Russell's
withdrawal nor the judgment obtained by Plaintiff based thereon. [R. 226-233 1 13] As
such, the defendant in Gardiner having not communicated with its attorney for one and
one-half years has no relation to the proper conduct of Defendant in this action. The real
reason why Defendant was unable to act sooner to file his Motion to Vacate the instant
judgment was because Defendant did not have actual notice of such judgment until August
28, 1998, as described above. As such, Defendant acted diligently in defending his
interests.
B.

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE THREE
MONTHS' PERIOD AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
The judgment in this case was entered first on April 23, 1998 [R. 96-97] and

then as amended on May 7, 1998 [R. 102-104] The record demonstrates that Defendant
did not receive actual notice of either judgment until served personally with the
Supplemental Proceedings Order on August 28, 1998 [R. 174-176 (Exhibit "13"); R. 226233 f 16] which Plaintiff's counsel concedes is tantamount to giving notice of entry of
judgment. [See Appellee's Brief, Page 19, Lines 3-4] Not having received any actual
notice of such judgment during the three months' period after entry of judgment rendered
Defendant unalerted to the need to take actions to protect his interests. Without any such
actual notice, a lay person could not be deemed lacking in diligence for failing to contact
the court about any possible events occuring in the lawsuit during a mere three month
11

Proceedings. [R. 226-233 t l 16-17] After learning from Mr. Flores that a judgment had
been entered against Defendant, and on September 21, 1998 (only three weeks after
obtaining actual notice of the judgment), Defendant hired current counsel, Montivel A.
Burke, II, to represent him in this action. [R. 226-233 t l 17-18] Such conduct constituted
prompt action by Defendant.
Also, Plaintiff s counsel points out the time of filing of appearance of counsel
by Defendant's attorney, Montivel A. Burke, II, in November 1998 in an attempt to show
the court that Defendant waited too long to hire an attorney to file the instant Motion to
Vacate the judgment in this case. However, as set forth in the Declarations of Defendant
[R. 226-233 f 18] and Defendant's current counsel [R. 253-256 3], Defendant hired
current counsel a mere three (3) weeks after obtaining actual notice of the judgment and
this was after Defendant had already appeared one time for the Supplemental Proceedings
hearing in this action. November 1998 merely represents the time when Defendant's
current counsel performed the minor function of filing the paper entitled "Notice of
Appearance of Counsel".
In addition, there were many facts and events in this case to review and the
law surrounding vacating the judgment entered against Defendant were complex.
Defendant's current counsel felt that diligence was required on his part to ensure that
Defendant had a proper right to vacate the judgment before filing same. [R. 253-256 ff
4-5] Indeed, by the time Defendant had received actual notice of the judgment, the three
13

period of time when before in the case Defendant had expected he would receive notices
from Plaintiff's counsel about such events, such as when he was served personally with
process in the case and when Plaintiff's attorney served the previous Motion to Compel,
both of which received responses by Defendant.
In addition, only Plaintiff, not Defendant, was responsible for pushing this
case along, since Defendant had not filed a counterclaim in this matter such as to pose
similar duties upon Defendant for moving the case along. Thus, Defendant acted diligently
during this period of time.
C.

DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT ONCE HE RECEIVED
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff s counsel makes the wild contention that Defendant was not diligent

because he failed to contact his attorney for a period of ten (10) months after his prior
attorney, Mr. Steven Russell, withdrew as counsel. However, such contention is far from
the truth. As set forth in detail hereinabove, Defendant acted diligently during the period
of time prior to receiving actual notice of the judgment. In addition, once Defendant
learned of the judgment on August 28, 1998, Defendant took prompt action to protect his
interests.
The record reflects that Defendant appeared less than two (2) weeks later at
the Court for the Supplemental Proceedings hearing on September 10, 1998, and shortly
thereafter contacted attorney German Flores to find out the import of such Supplemental
12

months' window following entry of the judgment had already expired, so filing of
Defendant's Motion to Vacate even the same day current counsel for Defendant was hired
would not have changed that fact.
Meanwhile, however, Defendant's current counsel promptly contacted
Plaintiff's counsel to get copies of relevant documents in the case and even appeared at the
office of Plaintiff's counsel with Defendant to have Defendant answer questions in lieu of
Plaintiff's counsel scheduling another Supplemental Proceedings hearing. [R. 253-256 1f
5] Plaintiff's counsel is estopped to argue that Defendant failed to hire an attorney to
defend his interests until the time when Defendant's current counsel actually filed the paper
called "Notice of Appearance of Counsel" with the court in November 1998 when
Plaintiff's counsel knew two (2) months previous thereto that Defendant's current counsel
had been hired and intended to move to vacate the instant judgment. Defendant's current
counsel spelled out in great detail the efforts and time exerted to investigate this case, both
facts and law, to ensure that Defendant's rights were properly protected. As such, both
Defendant and his current counsel were diligent in pursuing the vacating of the judgment
entered against Defendant herein.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAW.
Plaintiff's counsel argues that "last known address" as the term is used in Rule 5 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure means the address stated on the withdrawal notice by
14

Defendant's prior attorney, Mr. Russell. However, Plaintiffs counsel offers no case law
or other authority to support this proposition. Indeed, such an interpretation may apply
in many cases but cannot be said to apply strictly in all cases.
In the case at bar, the facts presented, as demonstrated by proper evidence
submitted previously by Defendant, illustrate that Defendant's Home Address and business
address were clearly known to Plaintiffs counsel. In particular, the specific evidence
presented by Defendant on this fact is that Plaintiff's counsel caused service of process on
Defendant personally at the inception of this lawsuit at Defendant's Home Address. [R.
32-35] Then, when Plaintiff's counsel made efforts to collect on the default judgment
against Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel caused service of the Supplemental Proceedings
Order on Defendant personally at Defendant's Home Address. [R. 108-110] Plaintiff's
counsel has presented no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that Plaintiff's counsel
made any efforts to locate Defendant at the address listed on the withdrawal notice
by Defendant's prior counsel, Mr. Russell. Rather, both Supplemental Proceedings
Orders served on Defendant in this action were served at Defendant's Home Address in
August 1998 [R. 107, 110] which was the first time that Defendant was given actual notice
of the judgment herein. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's counsel had clear knowledge that
Defendant still resided at Defendant's Home Address and that the best means of providing
actual notice to Defendant of such a critical and huge money judgment was to serve
Defendant at Defendant's Home Address. As such, Defendant is entitled to relief herein.
15

It is reasonable to assume that the Utah Legislature intended under any set of facts
for a defendant to be afforded due process by having the plaintiff use the best means
available of affording actual notice to the defendant. In the case at bar, the best means
available to Plaintiff's counsel of affording actual notice to Defendant of the judgment was
by serving Defendant at Defendant's Home Address as shown by Plaintiff's counsel
locating Defendant personally both at the beginning of this lawsuit and at the time of
collection on the judgment. Therefore, whether Plaintiff's counsel followed the Letter of
the law under Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in serving notices of the Motion for
Summary Judgment and judgment itself is not the critical issue. Rather, since Plaintiff's
counsel failed to follow the Spirit of the law under the factual circumstances of this case,
Defendant was deprived of due process by not receiving actual notice of the judgment until
August 28, 1998. In fact. Plaintiff's counsel has failed to submit any evidence
whatsoever to demonstrate that Defendant obtained actual notice of the judgment
prior to August 28, 1998. And, by such time, the three (3) months' window of Rule 60
(b)(1) was closed, which is why Rule 60 (b)(6) is the appropriate Rule enacted for this very
purpose of affording due process to defendants. Based thereon, the dictates of due process
and equity demand that Defendant be granted a fair opportunity to have a trial on the
merits. Under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, lack of actual notice to
Defendant of the judgment was tantamount to lack of due process. Thus, this Court
should grant all relief requested by Defendant on this appeal.
16

IV.

EQUITY REQUIRES GRANTING DEFENDANT RELIEF ON THIS APPEAL.
There are many facts as supported by competent evidence submitted by Defendant

which demonstrate that the demands of equity provide relief to Defendant on this appeal.
For example, the very judgment obtained by Plaintiff herein was based on a second set of
Request for Admissions (never received by Defendant until after acquiring actual notice
of the judgment in August 1998). Yet, the questions contained in such second set of
Request for Admissions were almost identical to those questions which were stated in
Plaintiff's first set of Request for Admissions to which Defendant had responded.
The first set of Request for Admissions stated only three (3) questions as follows
[R. 132-142 (Exhibit "2")]:
1.

Admit that you are a guarantor under the terms and conditions of the

lease, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", [emphasis added]
2.

Admit that you signed the Guarantee, a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit "B". [emphasis added]
3.

Admit that there is a balance due and owing under the lease in an

amount of at least $21,915.54.
Then, in Plantiff s second set of Request for Admissions, the following three (3) questions
were stated [R. 159-164 (Exhibit "7")]:
1.

Admit that Mi Ranchito d/b/a Guadalahara Grill is still an operating

business.
17

2.

Admit that the lease which is the subject of this action purports to have

signature of Manuel T. Armenia, [emphasis added]
3.

Since it appears that your signature on your response to Plaintiff's

Discovery Requests dated October 1, 1987 is the same persons signature that appears on
the guarantee agreement which is the subject of this action, admit that you signed the
guarantee, a copy of which is attached hereto, [emphasis added]
It is obvious from the foregoing display of Plaintiff's questions that both sets of
questions were asking the same admission to be made, namely, that Defendant signed the
guarantee. Defendant had already denied that he signed same both in Defendant's Answer
to the Complaint at the inception of this lawsuit, and then again in response to Plaintiff's
first set of Request for Admissions. Yet, Plaintiff later obtained the judgment against
Defendant based on the exact same question since Defendant never received such second
set of Request for Admissions and thus never had actual notice and opportunity to re-state
his denial thereof. In light of such facts, the demands of equity and fairness require that
Defendant be granted the relief requested on this appeal.
Also, this is not a case where a minimal judgment, such as $200.00, was entered
against Defendant. Rather, the judgment amount entered against Defendant in this case
was in the amount of $26,558.88! [R. 102-104] Where Defendant did not have actual
notice of the judgment until August 28, 1998, and was therefore deprived of due process
and a fair opportunity to move to vacate such judgment within the three (3) months' period
18

following entry of such judgment, and where the judgment itself is so huge in amount,
Defendant should be permitted under principles of equity to have the opportunity to defend
himself on the merits of this action.
Plaintiff's counsel wishes to have the judgment in this case stand as entered, which
in effect would permit Plaintiff's counsel to take advantage of serving Defendant at
Defendant's Home Address with a Supplemental Proceedings Order to enable Plaintiff's
counsel to pursue collection of the judgment against Defendant. However, on the other
hand, Plaintiff's counsel wishes to deny Defendant the right to receive the same type of
notice, i.e., service at Defendant's Home Address, of the judgment itself such that
Defendant would have a fresh three (3) months' period in which to move the court to
vacate the judgment entered. Substantial justice cannot be afforded to Defendant if such
results are permitted because they favor Plaintiff's counsel over Defendant for no
justifiable reason whatsoever. Thus, Defendant's appeal should be granted.
V.

THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE

OF

COUNSEL

CANNOT

DEFEAT

DEFENDANT'S

ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF BASED ON LACK OF DUE PROCESS.
Defendant contends that in the proper case as the case at bar, Defendant is entitled
to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where
counsel's conduct was so extremely negligent as to deprive Defendant of the ability to
properly defend himself. However, regardless of whether or not this Court agrees with
19

Defendant's position, Defendant is still entitled to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) on the main
grounds upon which this appeal is taken, namely, deprivation of due process.

The

deprivation of due process to Defendant is so obvious and so substantial that Defendant is
entitled to have a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits at a trial of this case.
Therefore, this court should grant Defendant's appeal.
Also, the trial court had discretion to grant Defendant's Motion to Vacate the
judgment ". . .upon such terms as are just. . . . "

Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure. The trial court could therefore have ordered Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff
for some of its attorney's fees and costs as a precondition to granting Defendant's Motion
to Vacate rather than cause Defendant's substantial rights to a trial on the merits be
forfeited. The Utah courts have clearly stated that it abhors forfeiture of rights to a trial
on the merits. As stated in Defendant's Appeal Brief, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly
supported this proposition as follows:
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without serious
injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward
the setting aside of default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt
about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have an opportunity to
present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance
with law and justice, [emphasis added] Interstate Excavating, supra at 371.
Based thereon, Defendant's appeal should be granted forthwith.

20

CONCLUSION
The dictates of due process and equity favor granting relief to Defendant in light of
the facts and circumstances of this case. The forfeiture of Defendant's rights to a trial on
the merits cannot be permitted in light of strong public policy and the evidence presented.
As such, this Court should grant all relief requested herein by Defendant.
Dated: July 23, 1999

LAW OFFICES OF MONTIVEL A. BURKE, II

ontivel A. Burke, lT~^
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Manuel T. Armenta

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - BY MAIL
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document described as BRIEF BY APPELLANT by mail, postage prepaid, to the
following, on the date of July 23

_, 1999.

Bryan W . Cannon, Esq.
Aspen Plaza
871 E. 9400 S.
Sandy, U T 84094
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principal. The problem here lies with the
verdict returned by the jury. They found
liability on the part of Tenhoeve, but
assessed damages at only $4,000. The
assessed damages against Interwest is in
the amount of $40,000, If in fact, Tenhoeve was a principal he would have the
same liability as Interwest. The verdict,
therefore, is inconsistent with finding
Tenhoeve as a principal. Therefore, the
motion to dismiss as to Tenhoeve will be
granted.
The confusion in this case appears to have
resulted from plaintiffs' casting of Tenhoeve in the doubtful dual role of tortfeasor
and defaulting obligor in the complaint.
This matter was not presented to the jury
for determination.
We are of the opinion that the trial court
did not err in his order dismissing the complaint against Tenhoeve, which had the
same effect as vacating the jury's verdict.
Nor do we consider that the court's appraisal of the rules of procedure as applied to the
history of this case, was inaccurate or inappropriate.
Affirmed.
STEWART and HOWE, JJ.f dissent.

GARDINER AND GARDINER
BUILDERS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Reid SWAPP aka Reid Swapp Construction Company, Defendants, CrossClaimants and Appellants,
and
Tanglewood SLC Associates, Defendant,
Cross-Claimant and Respondent.
No. 18079.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 2, 1982.
As sanction for repeatedly failing to
respond to discovery procedures and forvio-

lation of order to compel discovery, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G.
Hal Taylor, J., ordered all of defendant's
pleadings stricken(^and entered default
judgment against such defendant, (anil denied motion to set aside judgment, and such
defendant appealed The Supreme Court,
held that, trial court did not err in treating
motion as one concerning excusable neglect
rather than one concerningj^any other reason justifying relief" pursuant to governing
Rule of Civil Procedure.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error o=>957(l)
Judgment <§=*139
Trial court has considerable discretion
in ruling on motion to set aside default
judgment and Supreme Court will reverse
trial court only where clear abuse of discretion is shown. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
2. Judgment <s=>139
Where record showed that attorney's
failure to communicate with client may_npt
have been_eniirjgly_j)£gligence of attorney,
client failed to contact attorney_for one and
agnail years after he filecTanswer and counterclaim and client, by his own admission,
learned of default judgment entered
against him within three-month periodjpllowing judgment, trial court did not abuse
its discretion in testing client's motion to
set aside judgment as one involving excusable neglect rather than as involving "any
other reason justifying relief" within purview of governing Rule of Civil Procedure.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7).

Frederick A. Jackman, Paul James Toscano, Orem, for defendants, cross-claimants
and appellants.
John A. Snow, Patricia M. Leith, Salt
Lake City, for defendant cross-claimant
and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
As a sanction for repeatedly failing to
respond to discovery procedures, and for
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violation of the court's Order to Compel
Discovery, the district court ordered all of
the pleadings of defendant Reid Swapp aka
Reid Swapp Construction Company stricken, and entered default judgment against
that defendant and in favor of defendant
Tangle wood SLC Associates on its crossclaim.
The default judgment was entered July 1,
1981. On September 3, 1981, an Order in
Supplemental Proceedings was served at
the residence of Reid Swapp. Swapp failed
to appear at the hearing on that order, and
an Order to Show Cause was issued, which
was personally served on Swapp on September 22, 1981. On that same day, Tanglewood's Execution was personally served on
Swapp.
On October 13, 1981, new counsel employed by Swapp filed a motion to set aside
the judgment, and a motion to quash the
execution. These motions were heard on
October 19, 1981, and denied on that date.
The court held that Swapp's motion to set
aside the judgment was based on negligence, and was not filed within the threemonth time limit of Rule 60(bXl), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Swapp now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to
set aside the judgment under 60(b)(1). For
the purposes of his motion to set aside the
judgment, Swapp filed his affidavit in
which he stated that his attorney had never
communicated with him concerning the discovery process, nor had he informed Swapp
that he had received interrogatories, requests for production of documents or a
notice that Reid Swapp's deposition was to
be taken. Swapp contends that he did not
know of his attorney's stipulation to extend
the time to answer these discovery procedures, and was not informed that the order
compelling him to answer discovery was
issued. He further states that he did not
learn of the default judgment until he received the execution on September 22,1981.
Swapp contends that the district court
erred in testing his motion to set aside the
judgment under the provisions of Rule
60(bXl)t excusable neglect. He characteriz-

es the above facts asjibandonment by his
attorney, and~arpues that such abandonment constitutes "any other reason justifying"relief . . . "~under* Rule 60(b)(7). ~He
further argues that the negligence of his
attorney may not be imputed to him under
these circumstances. We do not agree.
[1] The trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to set aside a
default judgment under Rule 60(b) and this
Court will reverse the trial court only
where a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14
Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Central
Finance Company v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d
284, 452 P.2d 316 (1969); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429 (1973). We find no such abuse of
discretion here.
[2] While Swapp states in his affidavit
that his attornqy never communicated with
him concerning the discovery requests received, the record shows that the failure to
communicate may not have been entirely
the negligence of the attorney. Further,
even if the facts stated in the affidavit ara
true, Swapp failed to con tart hip attornpv\
for one and a half years after he filed his/
answer and counterclaim. In Airkem, su-v
pra, we found negligence on the part of the \
party, for such failure to communicate. In \
addition, Swapp should have learned of the I
judgment taken against him by early Sep- J
tember, when he was served with papers i n /
supplemental proceedings. By his own ad. #
mission, Swapp did learn of the judgment " ^ / r ^ f t ^ ,
on September 22, 1981, still within the J rUffC€ or
three-month period in which a motion undei^ )b\gu\utf
Tkule 60(bKl) may be granted,
v f Ifclk ^
We have previously held that the proviW«f v i
sions of Rule 60(b)(7) may not be used to
f*fi**'
circumvent the time limitation of Rule
60(b)(1). Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah, 567
P.2d 171 (1977). Swapp's contention that
his motion was brought on grounds other
than negligence is without merit.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
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employed for relief when grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect are asserted are encompassed within first subsection; otherwise, three-month
time limitation for filing motions pursuant
v.
to first subsection would be circumvented.
D.T. SOUTHERN PROPERTIES; James Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7).
E. Hogle, Jr.; and Cornelius J. Versteeg,
Defendants and Appellants.
4. Judgment <S=368
No. 910366-CA.
Reasons asserted for setting aside default
judgment which were that attorney
Court of Appeals of Utah.
neglected to file answer and movant had
Sept. 23, 1992.
mistakenly relied on attorney fell within
first subsection of rule allowing for such
Partner moved to set aside default relief when judgment has been entered bejudgment entered against him which relat- cause of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
ed to nonpayment on promissory note given excusable neglect, and not within rule's
to insurance company. The Seventh Dis- residuary subsection; therefore, threetrict Court, San Juan County, Boyd Bun- month time limitation for filing such monell, J., denied motion. Partnership and tion was applicable. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
partner appealed. The Court of Appeals, 60(b)(l, 7).
LINCOLN BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY; and Allstate Life Insurance
Company, Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Garff, J., held that: (1) three-month statute
of limitation for filing set aside motion
applied to claims of excusable neglect and
of reliance on former attorney, and (2) failure of insurance company to mail copy of
default judgment to partner did not invalidate default judgment.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error «=»842U)
Trial court's determination that motion
to set aside default judgment constitutes
claim of excusable neglect rather than constituting claim falling into set aside rule's
residuary category is matter of law, reviewable for correctness with no particular
deference. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(l,
7).

5. Judgment «=>131
Failure of plaintiffs to mail copy of
default judgment to defendant did not invalidate the default judgment. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rules 5(a), 58A(d); Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(4).
6. Judgment <s=>131
Defendant was provided notice of and
adequate opportunity for timely motion to
set aside default judgment when he was
personally served with court's order in supplemental proceedings seven weeks after
entry of default, even though plaintiff had
failed to mail notice of default judgment to
defendant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5(a),
58A(d); Judicial Administration Rule 4504(4).

2. Judgment *=>343, 386(1)
Residuary subdivision of rule allowing
motions to set aside judgment embodies
three requirements for relief: that reason
be one other than those listed in other
subdivisions; that reason justify relief;
and that motion be made within reasonable
time. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(7).

Clark W. Sessions and Michael T. Roberts, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees.

3. Judgment e»343
Residuary subdivision of rule allowing
motions to set aside judgment may not be

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF,
JJ.

Robert Felton and Harold R. Stephens,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
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OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendants D.T. Southern Properties
(DTSP) and James E. Hogle, Jr., appeal the
trial court's refusal to set aside a default
judgment entered against them in favor of
plaintiffs, Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance
Company (Lincoln) and Allstate Life Insurance Company (Allstate). Pursuant to
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
we granted permission to appeal the
court's interlocutory order denying the motion to set aside the default judgment. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The facts, which are undisputed, are
drawn from the record. On September 30,
1986, DTSP, a Utah general partnership,
executed and delivered a promissory note
for $450,000.00 to Surety Life Insurance
Company, the predecessor in interest to
Lincoln and Allstate. The general partners
who personally executed the note included
Hogle, Cornelius J. Versteeg, Dennis W.
Gay, and Antonius Versteeg. As part of
the transaction, DTSP, through the same
general partners, executed a deed of trust
as security for payment of the note. In
addition, Hogle and Cornelius J. Versteeg
executed a guaranty agreement in which
they guaranteed payment of the note.
The partnership failed to make payments
on the note, and a notice of default and
election to sell the trust property was filed.
The trustee subsequently gave notice of
sale of the trust property, but the sale was
cancelled after DTSP filed for protection
under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. In June 1989, the bankruptcy court dismissed DTSP's Chapter 11
case for failure to pay certain fees, failure
to file a plan of reorganization and a disclosure statement, and failure to file financial
reports.
The trustee again gave notice of sale of
the property, and at the trustee's sale on
October 16, 1989, Allstate, the highest bidder, purchased the property for $500,000.00. Apparently, that same day, DTSP
sued to enjoin the sale and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop the
•«te. However, DTSP failed to serve the
TRO prior to the sale. Thereafter, DTSP

did not pursue the lawsuit for an injunction.
On January 22, 1990, Lincoln and Allstate sued DTSP, Hogle, and Cornelius J.
Versteeg, by amended complaint, seeking
to recover a deficiency judgment pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1990), and
seeking to recover from Hogle and Versteeg based on the guaranty agreement.
On January 23, 1990, Hogle and Gay, the
registered agent of DTSP, were personally
served with a copy of the amended complaint
Versteeg filed an answer to the amended
complaint on February 8, 1990. Neither
DTSP nor Hogle, however, filed an answer
to the amended complaint. On Ffthruajai.
23, 1990, the clerk of the court entered
default againstJQISE^nd Hogle, and the
court entered^jug^ientj>y default against r
them on May <SF7"T995T
On July 16, 1990, the court signed an
order in supplemental proceedings requiring Hogle to appear on July 20, 1990, both
individually and on behalf of DTSP, to an
swer concerning his property and the prop-'
erty of DTSP. Hogle was perso_najly
served with a copy of the order onffulyT8,
J990,. At the request oi Harold SfepheiSf
attorney for DTSP and Hogle, the supplemental proceedings were continued to August 3, 1990. Neither Hogle nor his attorney appeared on August 3, 1990. The supplemental proceedings were continued to
August 20, 1990. Again, neither Hogle nor
his attorney appeared.
On August 21, 1990, the court signed a
second order in supplemental proceedings
requiring Hogle to appear before the court
on September U, 1990, both individually
and on behalf of DTSP, to answer concerning his property and the property of DTSP.
Hogle was personally served with a copy of
the order on August 27, 1990. Because
Hogle failed to comply with the order, the
court, on September 11, 1990, directed the
clerk of the court to issue a bench warrant
for Hogle, with which he was personally
served. Hogle again did not appear. On
October 29, 1990, the court issued a bench
warrant for Hogle to appear before the
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court on November 14, 1990. The bench
warrant, however, was recalled because it
was not timely served.
On November 30, 1990, Hogle, through
his attorney, Mr. Stephens, filed a motion
to set aside the default judgment. Hogle
subsequently discharged Mr. Stephens as
his attorney and retained Robert Felton as
his new attorney of record. Mr. Felton
filed a notice of appearance of counsel on
December 4, 1990. On December 6, 1990,
Hogle, through his new attorney, filed an
amended motion to set aside the default
judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(7).
By affidavit attached to the amended motion, Hogle claimed he delivered the amended complaint to his former attorney, Mr.
Stephens, who informed him that he would
handle the matter. According to Hogle,
Mr. Stephens told him in April 1990, that
an answer to the amended complaint had
been filed. Hogle further claimed, by way
of his affidavit, that upon receiving the
court's orders in supplemental proceedings,
he immediately contacted Mr. Stephens,
who assured him that he would take care
of the matter. Finally, Hogle claimed in
the affidavit that he relied on the professional skills of Mr. Stephens throughout
this case.
The court, on February 19, 1991, heard
oral argument on the motion to set aside
the default judgment, after which it took
the matter under advisement. On March 1,
1991, the court issued a memorandum decision denying the motion. In its ruling, the
court concluded that the grounds asserted
for setting aside the default judgment "fall
within Rule 60(b)(1), and the Motion was
not made within the time required by that
Rule." The court also determined, in view
of the surrounding circumstances, that Hogle was negligent in continuing to rely on
his attorney throughout the case. On
March 28, 1991, the court entered an order
denying the motion to set aside the default
judgment. DTSP and Hogle filed a notice
of appeal on April 18, 1991.
DTSP and Hogle claim that their failure
to file an answer or responsive pleading to
the amended complaint was due solely to

the negligence of their attorney, and that
their attorney misrepresented to them that
an answer had been filed. These circumstances, they contend, provide grounds for
relief from the default judgment under
subsection (7), rather than subsection (1) of
Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party ... from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ...
or (7) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment The
motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasonf ] (1) ... not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken.
[1] The trial court's determination that
the motion to set aside the default judgment constituted a Rule 60(b)(1) motion
rather than a Rule 60(b)(7) motion is a
conclusion of law. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385
(Utah App.1991). Consequently, we accord
it no particular deference and review it for
correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.t 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
[2,3] As the residuary clause of Rule
60(b), subsection (7) embodies three requirements for relief: "First, that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the
reason justify relief; and third, that the
motion be made within a reasonable time."
Laub v. South Cent Utah Tel Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304, 130&-07 (Utah 1982). Subsection (7) "'should be very cautiously and
sparingly invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional instances."' Id. at
1307-08 (quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287
F.Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.Okla.1968)). Furthermore, subsection (7) may not be employed for relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1).
Larsen r. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah
1984); Russell v. MartelU 681 P.2d 1193,
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1195 (Utah 1984). Otherwise, the threemonth time limitation for filing motions
pursuant to subsection (1) would be circumvented. Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Laub,
657 P.2d at 1308.
[4] The reasons asserted by DTSP and
Hogle for setting aside the default judgment, namely, that their attorney neglected
to file an answer and that Hogle mistakenTvreliedjn^his attorney's assurances that
an answer had been filed, fall wj^hin Rulp
60(b)U), which allows for relief when the
judgment has been entered because of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Cf. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1308
("This failure to act seasonably [through
defendant's own mistake or neglect] falls
more accurately under subdivision (1) of
rule 60(b)."); Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d
171, 173-74 (Utah 1977) (Rule 60(b)(1) held
to be dispositive when the issue is whether
due diligence was exercised in presenting
one's rights). Therefore, the trial court
correctly concluded that the grounds asserted for relief fall within subsection (1).
Because the grounds asserted for setting
aside the default judgment fall within subsection (1) of Rule 60(b), the three-month
time limitation for filing a motion is applicable. In the instant case, Hogle filed the
motion to set aside the default judgment on
November 30, 1990, six months after the
default judgment hadbeen entered. Ttius,
the motion was untimely. We therefore
affirm the trial court's refusal to set aside
the default judgment
[5,6] DTSP and Hogle argue that the
failure of Lincoln and Allstate to mail a
copy of the default judgment, as required
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 58A(d)
and 5(a) as well as Rule 4-504(4), Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, impaired
their ability to timely challenge the default
judgment Although Lincoln and Allstate
apparently concede the failure to give notice, such a failure does not invalidate the
default judgment1 Workman v. Nagle
Constr.,Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App.
1990) (citing Mountain States Tel & Tel
I. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(c) states that
l a ] judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a

v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988)).
Moreover, "the failure to give the required
notice is an important factor in determining
the timeliness of post-judgment proceedings, where an exact time limit is not pre-_
scribed." Workman, 802 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the argument that LincofiTand Allstate failed to
give notice, Hogle received notice of the
default judgment on July 18, 1990, whfijpJut
was personally served with the court's order in supplemental proceedings. TTiisnotice, which Hogle received approximately
seven weeks after the court entered default judgment, provided him adequate opportunity to timely move to set asideThe
default judgment
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that the grounds of DTSP's and Hogle's
motion to set aside the default judgment
constituted a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
such motion. Accordingly, we affirm.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
(o
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James N. FOWLER and Sherril Fowler,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Terry R. SEITER, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 910698-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept 23, 1992.
Lessees brought forcible entry and
other claims against lessors of storage
unit The Third District Court, Salt Lake
City, John A. Rokich, J., entered judgment
lien on real property, when the same is signed
and filed as herein above provided."

